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Summary: The recent Kadi judgment, in which the ECJ invalidated a 
Community regulation implementing a SC sanction resolution on ac-
count of a violation of EU fundamental rights, in several ways con-
stitutes a landmark constitutional ruling. Particularly noteworthy are 
the Court’s pronouncements on the relationship between EU law and 
international law. Central to this reasoning is the principle of auton-
omy of the Community legal order. Departing from this concept, the 
ECJ in Kadi seems to draw a sharp and impermeable line between 
‘domestic’ EU law and ‘external’ UN law. For this allegedly strong 
dualist approach, the Court has been severely criticised. This paper 
will examine to what extent this criticism is justiﬁ ed. It comes to the 
conclusion that if the premise of an autonomous legal order is accept-
ed, the choices made by the ECJ in Kadi were legitimate. In addition, 
this article inquires how the Court’s approach relates to the concept of 
constitutional pluralism, which is very much in vogue today as an ex-
planatory framework for the foundations of the European legal order. 
It is submitted that Kadi is hard to reconcile with this paradigm.
I Introduction
On 3 September 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued 
a ruling that even before it was handed down was destined to become an 
instant classic of EU law: Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council.1 In Kadi, the 
Court partially annulled a Community regulation, enacted in reference to 
a common position under the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) 
of the European Union (EU), which implemented a Security Council (SC) 
resolution designed to freeze funds of individuals and organisations asso-
ciated with terrorist networks.2 Whereas the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
had initially rejected this claim,3 the ECJ found the sanction measure to 
∗ Department of Constitutional and International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Gron-
ingen.
1  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Inter-
national Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] nyr.
2  See especially Council Regulation (EC) no 881/2002, OJ 2002, L 139/9; Common Posi-
tion 2002/402/CFSP, OJ 2002, L 139/4; S/RES/1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999.  
3  Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649; 
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be in breach of certain fundamental rights guaranteed under EU law.4 
The judgment, which was delivered against the background of the global 
war on terror, constitutes a potent cocktail of some of the most highly 
proﬁ led and contested issues of the European constitutional debate. The 
three main topics were community competence, the reception of interna-
tional law in the EU legal order, and the protection of fundamental rights. 
Of these issues, what probably attracted most attention were the Court’s 
pronouncements on the relationship between EU law and international 
law. It is this subject that will be the focus of this paper.5 
Kadi has been hailed as an important marker in the development of 
human rights protection,6 and, correspondingly, as a clear signal that this 
kind of safeguarding should be sped up at the level of the UN.7 Nonethe-
less, the judgment also received a good deal of criticism. Leading scholars 
on European constitutional law such as Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph 
Weiler have condemned the ruling as being ‘parochial’ in tone and lack-
ing in judicial integrity.8 As the term ‘parochial’ implies, the cause of this 
critique lies not so much in the actual outcome of the case, but in the way 
the ECJ in Kadi carves out a place for the EU in the international legal 
order. In arriving at the conclusion that the contested regulation violated 
primary EU law, it effectively fenced off the Union legal order from the in-
ternational plane. In contrast to the CFI, which had considered the case 
Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission [2005] ECR II-3533.
4  More speciﬁ cally, the applicants in Kadi, a Saudi Arabian and a Swedish national, argued 
that the regulation, under which they were listed as suspected terrorists, violated their right 
to respect for property, their right to be heard and their right to effective judicial review.  
5  Although technically not always correct, this paper will not critically discern between the 
terms EU and EC. 
6  See Takis Tridimas, ‘Terrorism and the ECJ: Empowerment and Democracy in the EC 
Legal Order’ (19 March 2009) Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 
12/2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365385>.    
7  As matters currently stand, the task of overseeing the execution of terrorism sanctions 
is primarily the responsibility of the UN Sanctions Committee, an ancillary organ of the SC. 
The Sanctions Committee is supported by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team, which comments on the activities of the former. Listing and de-listing mechanisms 
at the level of the UN, centred on the Sanctions Committee, are predominantly diplomatic 
in nature. Even though the SC, after persistent criticism that had arisen even before the 
ECJ’s judgment in Kadi, introduced some innovations to the review procedure of listings in 
two subsequent resolutions (S/RES/1730 (2006) of 19 December 2006 and S/RES/1822 
(2008) of 30 June 2008), there is no quasi-judicial reviewing body present that might dimin-
ish concerns of due process rights violations. According to the Monitoring Team in its ninth 
and latest report (S/2009/245 paras 17-18), there is no need to establish such an organ, as 
domestic courts that have stepped in, such as the ECJ, can help the Sanctions Committee 
to strengthen the sanctions regime.  
8  See Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order 
after Kadi’ Jean Monnet Working Paper No 1/09 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/pa-
pers/09/090101.html>; ‘Editorial’, (2009) 19 European Journal of International Law 895.
95CYELP 5 [2009] 93-119
chieﬂ y through the prism of international law, the ECJ focused on the 
domestic law of the EU.
Key to the Court’s self-referential treatment of the problem that it 
saw itself confronted with in Kadi was the principle of autonomy of the 
EU legal system. As is well-known, this paradigm, which the ECJ elabo-
rated almost half a century ago in the seminal cases Van Gend & Loos 
and Costa/ENEL,9 together with the related notions of direct effect and 
supremacy, serves as the foundation stone of EU constitutional doctrine. 
Despite the time that has elapsed since its invention, the concept of au-
tonomy, due to questions surrounding the principle’s conceptual feasibil-
ity, retains a somewhat axiomatic status. In view of the important rami-
ﬁ cations of the Kadi judgment, however, it seems justiﬁ ed to reconsider 
the principle. Not surprisingly, such an inquiry is triggered by a case in-
volving the relationship between EU and international law. Questions on 
ultimate authority often reveal themselves at the border of legal orders. 
Within the broader European legal order, theoretical disagreement on 
the exact rationale behind their demarcation notwithstanding, these bor-
ders are increasingly transparent. At the same time, however, the ECJ’s 
stance in Kadi may shed light on a proper conception of the internal 
constellation of the EU. For one thing, a strong emphasis on autonomy 
seems to be at odds with the celebrated pluralistic nature of the Union 
legal structure. 
Along these lines, this paper will argue that in one sense the Kadi 
reasoning on the relationship between European and international law 
follows logically from the ECJ’s broader doctrine on the autonomous na-
ture of EU law. It submits, however, that at another level and in view of 
the pluralistic set-up of the EU, the ruling raises conceptual questions 
that normally do not arise so overtly. Indeed, in attempting to live up to 
the very principles it had designed in order to create a veritable ‘Com-
munity of law’, the ECJ in Kadi at the same time paradoxically seems to 
cast doubt on the credibility of the EU’s pluralistic sui generis nature. 
To assess this argument, the paper will ﬁ rst discuss the concept of au-
tonomy, and link this to theories regarding sovereignty and pluralism. 
Next, it evaluates the function and place of the principle in Kadi. This 
is followed by an appraisal of the possible conceptual repercussions of 
the ruling and its meaning for the internal machinery of the Union. The 
paper will conclude by asking whether Kadi could have been decided in 
a different way. 
9  Resp. Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] 
ECR 1; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
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II Autonomy and pluralism 
By putting a strong emphasis on the autonomy the EU legal order, 
the ECJ in Kadi stressed that international law cannot affect the internal 
allocation of powers.10 The Court linked this perception with the famil-
iar statement that the EU is based on the rule of law,11 ﬁ rst explicitly 
put forward in the often cited Les Verts case.12 In combination, it can 
be inferred from the decision that these precepts forced the ECJ to the 
conclusion that ‘the obligations imposed by an international agreement 
cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the 
EC Treaty (…)’.13 Consequently, it could only measure the contested regu-
lation against the EU’s own framework of norms. In doing so, the Court 
adopted a view that most lawyers would label dualist.14 This can be said 
to attest to a vision according to which the EU and international law be-
long to separate legal orders.15 To phrase it differently: the Court’s posi-
tion in Kadi is founded on the premise that the EU draws from a source 
different from international law. Thus, in the opinion of the ECJ, legally 
speaking the world appears to be a fragmented place, in which there is no 
single point of authority to adhere to. 
The attitude of the ECJ vis-à-vis the international legal order stands 
in sharp contrast to the manner in which it views the internal legal or-
der of the EU. Here, the Court basically negates the validity of a dual-
ist approach. And, signiﬁ cantly, the principle of autonomy serves as an 
instrument to accomplish this negation, since the ECJ asserted the au-
tonomous nature of the Community in Van Gend & Loos and Costa/ENEL 
with a clear goal in mind: to establish the notions of direct effect and su-
premacy, bedrock pillars of the EU’s special constitutional construction. 
However, arguably, the principle did not constitute a necessary precondi-
tion for the tenability of these concepts.16 Instructive in this regard is the 
Opinion in Costa of A-G Lagrange, who maintained that it was perfectly 
feasible to ground direct effect and supremacy in member-state consti-
tutional doctrine.17 Possibly, therefore, the principle of autonomy was 
initially primarily meant to convince interlocutors at a national level.
10  Kadi (n 1) para 282.
11  Kadi (n 1) para 280.
12  Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 para 23.
13  Kadi (n 1) para 285.
14  See text at n 57-59.
15  Kadi (n 1) paras 281 and 317. See also de Búrca (n 8) 42.
16  See Bruno de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in Paul 
Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford 1999) 177-183.
17  Costa/ENEL at 620-623 of the Opinion of A-G Lagrange.
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In Van Gend & Loos and Costa/ENEL, the ECJ - and with it the EU 
- embarked on a journey which, along the way, has been recognised as 
a crossing towards ‘constitutionalisation’ of the Treaties. As has been 
famously described by Joseph Weiler, this has involved an intricate, dia-
lectical process between law and politics.18 In the course of this process, 
two aspects have been crucial: ﬁ rst, the initial merging of a suprana-
tional, functional posture at a juridical level with an intergovernmental 
approach in politics; secondly, the ECJ furnishing this combination with 
legitimacy by polishing it with the insertion of rule-of-law requirements.19 
As a result, for a long time the Court’s theoretical foundation of European 
integration, the autonomous nature of the Treaties, was never seriously 
questioned as such. While the EU continued to be gradually impregnated 
by this type of ‘low-intensity constitutionalism’20 - not to mention the 
complicity in this process, by way of the preliminary reference procedure, 
of national courts - the issue simply did not come up in an explicit way.21 
When the subject eventually did emerge - in the early 1990s, following 
the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht - the EU’s claim to 
normative authority, inherent in Van Gend & Loos and Costa/ENEL, was 
already well established. Subsequently, acts of resistance stemming from 
national courts, most notably the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
mainly amounted to a certain status quo.22
What were these misgivings? In hindsight, one can say that they 
originated from a loss of inﬂ uence on the part of the Member States who, 
in the new Treaties in many instances, lost their veto power, coupled with 
an expansion of EU competences.23 Thus, state sovereignty resurfaced 
as an issue on the European agenda. According to the German Consti-
tutional Court, its resistance was principally caused by a concern for 
democracy, the inseparable nexus of the concept of sovereignty in nation-
state doctrine. Judging that the EU suffered from a legitimacy problem, 
it consequently argued in its notorious Maastricht ruling that the EU was 
18  JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403. See also 
Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional 
Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law 332. 
19  Cf Maduro (n 18) 334-340, arguing at 337 that ‘(i)n the process of European integration, 
constitutionalism as the prevailing form of power followed the claim of normative authority 
and not vice versa’. 
20  Maduro (n 18) 340-343.
21  Even with the ﬁ rst sparks of resistance against the path of the Court, which erupted in 
the 1970s, the emphasis was not so much on the alleged autonomous nature of the Com-
munity, but on the related claim to supremacy and on the quality of the rule of law in the 
Community legal order. See, most notably, BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974] (Solange I).  
22  BVerfGE 89, 155 [1994] (Maastricht). See, more recently, eg the ruling of the Polish Con-
stitutional Tribunal of 11 May 2005, Case K 18/04 (Accession Treaty).
23  See n 18. 
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still essentially to be seen as some kind of international organisation, a 
Staatenverbund.24 This in turn meant that the autonomy of the EU could 
only have a derivative nature and that the Karlsruhe Court had the ulti-
mate power to declare European measures void on German soil. Although 
it never explicitly contradicted the German decision, it seems to be clear, 
however, that this is not what the ECJ had in mind. For one thing, the 
Court has repeatedly declared that EU law functions independently of 
the law of the Member States, even if this has a constitutional character: 
the validity of a European norm can only be judged in the light of EU law 
itself.25 Still, this does not justify the ECJ’s claim to normative authority. 
It also does not explain how an autonomous Union relates to constituent 
parts that equally claim to have independent legal foundations.
The obvious place to look for answers is in Van Gend & Loos and 
Costa/ENEL. As will be recalled, the Court in Van Gend & Loos asserted 
that the
Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual ob-
ligations between the contracting states … the Community consti-
tutes a new legal order of international law for the beneﬁ t of which 
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
ﬁ elds, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States 
but also their nationals.26
A year later, in Costa, it added: 
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has 
created its own legal system … the law stemming from the treaty, 
an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and 
original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as community law 
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into 
question.27
What to make of this? Both rulings provide complementary and, in 
some respects, also different rationales.28 Noteworthy in particular in Van 
24  BVerfGE 89, 155 (181). The Bundesverfassungsgericht has recently afﬁ rmed this posi-
tion in its judgment on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the Court in 
Lissabon adopts a more friendly tone towards the process of European integration than it 
did in Maastricht - it speaks of the Europarechtsfreundlichkeit of the German constitution 
- the core elements of its Maastricht reasoning remain intact. See BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/08 of 
30 June 2009 225-229.  
25  See eg Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727 para 14.
26  Van Gend & Loos (n 9) 10.
27  Costa/ENEL (n 9) 601. 
28  Cf Monica Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart, Ox-
ford and Portland 2006) 166-186.
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Gend & Loos is the Court’s appeal to the direct bond between the Com-
munity and the citizens of the Member States. This means that the Com-
munity is not only a product of the contracting states, but must also 
somehow be regarded as the expression of the will of its peoples. Typical 
in Costa, on the other hand, is the more logic-based emphasis on the 
importance of unity. The Costa reasoning features high in the justiﬁ ca-
tion of autonomy, defended by Rene Barents.29 Barents essentially argues 
that the autonomous nature is inherent in the Treaties. If this were dif-
ferent, EU law would not be able to uphold its uniform character, which, 
in turn, according to Barents, is a necessary precondition for attaining 
and maintaining a common market. Even if this argument has a circu-
lar ring, it exposes a quality, also apparent in Kadi, that seems crucial 
for a clear understanding of the notion of autonomy: its self-referential 
character. That is, in order to realise the objectives set by the Treaties, 
EU norms can only be judged against their own frame of law. This con-
struction necessitates some kind of ultimate authority. Self-referentiality 
only makes sense if there is no external normative point of reference and, 
a fortiori, no external legal authority that can arbitrate on the validity of 
European norms. Could it therefore be that the principle of autonomy in 
effect comes down to a disguised claim to sovereignty?30 
 Sovereignty is often considered as a problematic concept in the con-
text of the EU. The reason for this is that the notion appears to be in-
extricably linked with state-centred thinking. And arguably, the whole 
concept of European integration was ‘invented’ to push such tendencies 
aside.31 The main problem of employing sovereignty-based reasoning, 
however, is that when the notion, as it is traditionally understood, is 
projected on the ECJ’s concept of autonomy, this almost necessarily has 
to mean that the Member States have lost their sovereign quality. Sov-
ereignty is commonly interpreted as a legal concept with meta-juridical 
components.32 It presupposes a pre-constitutional carrier, a pouvoir con-
stituant. This pouvoir constituant itself is necessarily placed outside the 
legal order it has brought into being.33 Within the legal order, by way of 
29  R Barents, The Autonomy of the Community Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
2004). 
30  See eg Andràs Jakab, ‘Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question: Compromise Strategies in 
Constitutional Argumentation before European Integration and since’ (2006) 2 European 
Constitutional Law Review 375. 
31  See Weiler (n 18) 2481. 
32  See on the historical development of the notion of sovereignty: Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine 
Staatslehre, (3rd edn Julius Springer Verlag, Berlin 1919) 435-489. On the different aspects 
of the concept, see Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, Oxford and Portland 
2003).
33  See Hans Lindahl, ‘Sovereignty and Representation in the European Union’ in Walker (n 
32) 87-114. See, from the same author, also: ‘Constituent Power and Reﬂ exive Identity: To-
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some kind of representation, the sovereign serves as a device to explain 
the validity of the norms of the order. This explanation, however, neces-
sitates a certain amount of unity and, accordingly, of hierarchy. Lacking 
this, there would be no telling how to conceive of the sovereign and how 
to establish what the content of the common good in a particular polity 
is. It is for this reason that theories such as ‘multilevel constitutional-
ism’, in which sovereignty is attributed to the peoples of the Union but 
where an ultimate norm or set of norms testifying to this is absent, seem 
ﬂ awed.34 Not because it is conceptually unthinkable that the ‘peoples of 
Europe’ or, for that matter, another clarifying principle could explain and 
legitimise the authority exercised by the EU,35 but because sovereignty, 
as a ﬁ ctional and circular concept, needs a constitutional norm or claim 
that designates a sovereign as sovereign. Without this, there cannot be 
a people of the Union. A theoretical constellation in which this problem 
is dodged - ie envisioning a framework with multiple sites of authority 
with varying corresponding conceptions of the common good - therefore 
stands on soggy constitutional ground.36 
A possible way out of this dilemma can be found in theories usu-
ally labelled as ‘constitutional pluralism’. Regardless of the question of 
whether or not this is to be called sovereignty, this theory, in its basic 
form, accepts the claim of the ECJ to ultimate authority of the EU, at 
least within its sphere of competences, and tries to reconcile this claim 
with member-state sovereignty.37 In doing so, constitutional pluralism es-
wards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Para-
dox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP, Oxford 2007) 9. 
34  See eg Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multilevel constitutionalism in the European Union’ (2002) 27 
European Law Review 511, 515-521; Cf also LFM Besselink, Een samengestelde Europese 
constitutie/A composite European constitution (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2007). 
35  See in this respect eg Dieter Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (1995) 1 Euro-
pean Law Journal 282. 
36  Adherents of multilevel constitutionalist theories will claim that this critique focuses too 
much on the paradigm of the unitary state and fails to take into account the experience of 
federalism which, arguably, also draws on a division of sovereignty over different levels of 
authority. Cf in this respect eg Stefan Oeter, ‘Federalism and Democracy’ in Armin von Bog-
dandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart, Oxford and 
Portland 2007) 53. Although this is to a certain extent a matter of deﬁ nition, it is submitted, 
however, that federalism, properly understood, is marked by competing conceptions of the 
common good, that is, by rivaling sources of legal authority. In a federation, one might also 
argue, the question of sovereignty is suspended.  For that reason and in that sense, federal-
ism more closely resembles the paradigm of constitutional pluralism, discussed below. 
37  See eg Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Practical Reason 
(OUP, Oxford 1999); Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional 
Pluralism in Action’ in Walker (n 32) 501; Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ 
(2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317; Mattias Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional 
Conﬂ ict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ 
(2005) 11 European Law Journal  262; R Barents, ‘De voorrang van unierecht in het per-
spectief van constitutioneel pluralisme’ (2009) 58 Sociaal-economische wetgeving 44. 
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sentially takes a pan-European view. It argues that both EU and Member 
States’ legal orders, while being in principle completely self-referential, 
somehow recognise each other’s existence and mutual role in a larger 
European enterprise. As a result, hierarchy has made way for heterarchy. 
Furthermore, in acknowledging this, so the reasoning goes, their own per-
ceptions of concepts relating to the validity and authority of legal norms 
have, over time, evolved and, in the name of tolerance, lost their sharp 
bite. An example of such an advance can be found in, on the one hand, 
the insertion in the EU Treaty of the ‘national identity clause’38 and, on 
the other hand, integration clauses in national constitutions.39 Another 
illustration, not concerning positive law but judicial practice, provides 
the well-known Solange saga.40 In this line of cases, the German Consti-
tutional Court, while retaining the ultimate competence to strike down 
European measures in the event of a constitutional conﬂ ict, eventually 
declared that it would trust the ECJ in matters of fundamental rights. 
Through this dialogue, it can be argued, human rights protection at the 
level of the EU got a serious boost. What is more, the ECJ on later occa-
sions, most notably in Omega Spielhallen, rewarded the faith invested in 
the Court by granting protection to national constitutional values.41
Taking account of the dynamics at work in European integration 
and leaving open the ‘ultimate arbiter’ question, pluralism provides an 
attractive framework with which to describe the current European con-
stellation. Still, some questions can be raised as to its tenability. First, 
returning to the validity of the ECJ’s concept of autonomy, there is the 
issue of how to regard the fact that the EU in a fundamental way remains 
dependent on its constituent parts. Although the EU may have the inter-
pretative Kompetenz-Kompetenz to deﬁ ne the scope of its competences, 
it does not possess the legislative power to do so.42 This power, arguably 
essential to make a claim to full constitutional authority, still resides 
with the Member States, who, as a result, can keep calling themselves the 
Herren der Verträge.43 A possible response to this is to maintain that the 
38  Art 6 (3) EU.  
39  Eg art 23 of the German Grundgesetz and art 88-1-88-5 of the French Constitution.
40  BVerfGE 73, 339 [1984] (Solange II). 
41  Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609.  
42  See on this difference JHH Weiler and Ulrich Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community 
Legal Order - Through the Looking Glass’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 
423.
43  Cf Udo Di Fabio, ‘Der neue art 23 des Grundgesetzes: Positivierung vollzogenen Verfas-
sungswandels oder Verfassungsneuschöpfung?’ (1993) 32 Der Staat 191, who remarks, at 
201, that Kompetenz Kompetenz ‘nichts anderes als eine Konkretisierung von Souveränität 
ist (…)’ (‘Kompetenz Kompetenz is nothing but a concretisation of sovereignty’ - transl. 
JWvR). Note with regard to the credibility of the EU’s autonomy claim, also the inclusion in 
Article 50 of the new EU Treaty of a right of withdrawal. 
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Member States are bound to follow the amendment procedure laid down 
in Article 48 EU, a process that is infused with the enhanced involvement 
of EU institutions in the new Lisbon Treaty.44 This would mean they are 
no longer pouvoirs constituants, but have become pouvoirs constitués.
Secondly, the question seems relevant to understand how the EU 
legal order and the legal orders of the Member States relate to each other. 
Crucially, ‘is there law between the heterogeneous legal orders’?45 Ac-
cording to a ‘radical’ pluralist approach, defended by Barents, the rela-
tionship between the different legal orders is, due to their self-referential 
character, purely factual.46 As such, there is no European sphere in a 
normative sense: conﬂ icts have to be solved in a political way. A more 
moderate account of constitutional pluralism, in contrast, does assume 
a degree of normative coherence, in the sense that it expects a commit-
ment of the legal actors involved to certain values and principles that 
help to accommodate mutual interests and avoid conﬂ ict.47 This means 
that European pluralism has, to some extent, a limited nature and that 
there is an overarching normative framework which the various players 
have to adhere to.
These considerations have one thing in common: they are both con-
cerned with questions that are situated at an internal level; that is, they 
focus on the EU and the Member States inter se. In light of the outcome 
in Kadi, more seriously from a practical perspective is how the issue of 
autonomy unfolds at the level of the international legal order. How does 
European plurality confront law external to its own order? Does its own 
particular set-up invite or, in order to remain convincing, even require 
a similar engagement at other levels? If so, how does one convert the 
language of values and principles, making up the grease between the 
adjacent legal orders of Europe, into actual authority? And, if the answer 
is negative, what does this say about the nature of the internal constel-
lation? 
III The principle of autonomy in Kadi 
Focusing in the previous section on an exploration of the autono-
mous nature of the EU from an internal perspective, the external machi-
44  See Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 para 58. It could even be argued that 
the Member States are bound in this procedure by certain material limitations. See in this 
respect Opinion 1/91 (EEA Agreement) [1991] ECR 6079. 
45  ‘Editorial: “The Law of the Laws” - Overcoming Pluralism’ (2008) 4 European Constitu-
tional Law Review 395, 396.
46  R Barents, The Autonomy of the Community Law Chapter 8. 
47  Cf eg Kumm (n 37) who approaches pluralism mainly in substantive terms with Maduro 
(n 37) who takes a more procedural view.
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nations of the concept were only brieﬂ y touched upon. This is where 
Kadi comes in. As mentioned, looking to the reasoning in Kadi, the ECJ 
uses the notion principally to assert the self-referential character of EU 
law in the face of competing claims of an international nature. Given the 
autonomous nature of the EU legal order, the Court was not willing to 
accord special signiﬁ cance to the argument that the contested regulation 
originated from the international plane. The fact that in this case the 
international measure that was implemented was not just any rule, but 
a SC resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, made no 
difference to the ECJ. Neither did the fact that the content of the resolu-
tion effectively left no room for discretion with regard to its implementa-
tion. What counted most was ‘that measures incompatible with respect 
for human rights are not acceptable in the Community’.48 At ﬁ rst glance, 
therefore, the principle of autonomy in Kadi functions as a hinge, with 
the ECJ as locksmith. In the words of Stefan Griller: 
while internally stressing the autonomy of the Community legal sys-
tem serves to preserve (…) a higher derogatory rank vis-à-vis national 
law, externally it serves to reduce the binding force of international 
obligations: within the Community they may only be implemented 
and enforced if properly authorised by the Community legal sys-
tem.49
Kadi involved only the review of the regulation. Because the Com-
munity is not a member of the UN - only states are - the ECJ did not con-
sider itself bound by the implementing resolution. For that reason, the 
latter measure had not become part of the EU legal order. According to 
the Court, this did not in any way challenge the primacy of the resolution 
as a matter of international law.50 However, the UN Charter, typically for 
international organisations, does not stipulate how decisions from its in-
stitutions should be transposed into domestic law nor does it determine 
the status thereof at this level.51 In the same vein, the ECJ did not show 
itself to be convinced by the argument that Article 103 UN, prescribing 
the precedence of UN law in the event of conﬂ icting obligations, would 
entail that binding measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
acquired some kind of immunity,52 especially since the Treaties do not 
provide a basis for this. In the opinion of the Court, neither Article 297 
48  Kadi (n 1) para 284.
49  Stefan Griller, ‘International Law, Human Rights and the European Community’s Au-
tonomous Legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi’ (2008) 4 
European Constitutional Law Review 528, 539.
50  Kadi (n 1) para 288.
51  Kadi (n 1) para 298.
52  Kadi (n 1) para 300.
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EC - providing for coordinating steps to be taken by the Member States 
in order to fulﬁ l obligations relating to the purpose of maintaining peace 
and international security - nor Article 307 EC - stressing that obligations 
arising from agreements concluded before 1958 shall not be affected by 
the Treaties - could derogate from Article 6 EU, the embodiment of the 
values on which the EU is founded.53 Finally, the ECJ considered that all 
this would not be different in the hypothetical situation that the resolu-
tion did form part of the EU legal sphere. If the UN Charter was binding 
on the EU, the Court argued while invoking its case law, it would have a 
status above secondary law, but still below the level of the Treaties.54
In not taking into account the special dimension of the case at hand 
in its review, the Court effectively barred the EU’s gates to the interna-
tional legal order. It was submitted earlier that the ECJ’s reasoning in 
Kadi, therefore, appears to attest to a dualist view on the relationship 
between European and international law. Obviously, this does not mean 
that the Court thinks that the EU does not have to conform to the latter’s 
norms in any way. ‘(T)he Community’s municipal legal order and the in-
ternational legal order’, Advocate General Maduro stated in his Opinion 
to the case, do not ‘pass by each other like ships in the night.’55 Hence, 
the EU, as an international legal subject, has to respect international 
law in the exercise of its powers.56 Then what does it mean exactly to 
be characterised as dualist? Just like its counterpart, monism, dualism 
is notoriously hard to deﬁ ne.57 Importantly, the terms seem to relate to 
two different but connected conceptions on the relationship between le-
gal orders. One view, equating the notions with pluralism and constitu-
tionalism, involves the fundamental question, reminiscent of the debate 
between Kelsen and Schmitt in the 1920s, on how best to describe the 
global normative set-up. Is the world a place in which, ultimately, there 
is some form of legal unity - a Grundnorm upon which all other law is de-
pendent as to its validity? Or is the world, from a normative perspective, 
an inherently fragmented place in which different sites of constitutional 
53  Kadi (n 1) paras 301-304.
54  Kadi (n 1) paras 305-308. See also Rass Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the Euro-
pean Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn 
2008) 173-174.
55  Kadi (n 1) para 22 of the Opinion of A-G Maduro. 
56  Kadi (n 1) paras 291-292. 
57  See eg John H Jackson, ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis’ 
(1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 310; Anne Peters, ‘The Position of Inter-
national Law Within the European Community Legal Order’ (1997) 40 German Yearbook of 
International Law 9; Jan Klabbers, ‘International Law and Community Law: The Law and 
Politics of Direct Effect’ (2002) 21 Yearbook of European Law  263; Gráinne de Búrca and 
Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘The Denationalization of Constitutional Law’ (2006) 47 Harvard Inter-
national Law Journal 243.
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authority, most notably states, coexist alongside each other?58 Another 
view of monism and dualism is more technical in nature and relates to 
the question on how international law is received in domestic legal or-
ders. In this respect, one can discern between systems of incorporation, 
in which international law is received as international law, and systems 
of transformation, in which, to become valid, international law has to be 
transposed into domestic law.59
The reason why it appears to be relevant to go into this distinction 
- or, for that matter, into labelling at all - is to be able to compare the rul-
ing of the ECJ with that of the CFI and to judge both decisions on their 
merits.60 The ruling of the CFI in Kadi differs signiﬁ cantly from the judg-
ment of the ECJ.61 Where the latter chose to fully review the contested 
regulation, the former, apart from a somewhat surprising review to ius 
cogens, essentially judged that its hands were tied. The CFI arrived at 
this conclusion after having established that both as a matter of interna-
tional law and as a matter of EU law it had to respect the binding char-
acter of the resolution that was at issue. Qua international law, because 
in light of Article 103 UN the Member States were to accord primacy to 
norms originating from the UN Charter; an obligation the EU could not 
interfere with by way of Article 307 EC.62 Qua EU law, because the CFI, in 
contrast to the ECJ, did consider the EU bound by UN law. To that end, 
it referred to the substitution principle of International Fruit, according 
to which an international agreement to which the Community is not a 
party can nonetheless be part of the EU legal order if the Community has 
replaced the Member States with regard to their commitments under the 
agreement.63 Moreover, in a more fundamental vein, the CFI seemed to be 
58  See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (transl. from 2nd German edn UCP, Los Angeles 
1967); Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (9th edn Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1993).
59  Critical: Klabbers (n 57) 294-295.
60  Cataloguing perspectives on the relationship between international law and domestic 
law as monist or as dualist has become increasingly controversial for being out of touch 
with the 21st century reality of globalisation. Von Bogdandy, for example, maintains that 
‘from a scholarly perspective, [monism and dualism] are intellectual zombies of another 
time and should be laid to rest, or “deconstructed”.’ (See Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, 
Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Do-
mestic Law’ (2008) 6 International Constitutional Law Review 397, 401). Although it is true 
that both notions can be confusing and do not always sit comfortably with the realities of 
present-day legal practice, they are nevertheless helpful in furnishing two opposite points 
of a spectrum as regards how to understand the interaction between international law and 
domestic law. 
61  See de Búrca (n 8) 23-37; Griller (n 49) 533-539. Critical on the ruling of the CFI: Chris-
tina Eckes, ‘Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures - The Yusuf and Kadi 
Judgments of the Court of First Instance’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 74.
62  Kadi (n 3) paras 181-188; Yusuf (n 3) paras 231-238.
63  Kadi (n 3) 203; Yusuf (n 3) 253. See Joined Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company 
v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219.
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of the opinion that a deferential attitude towards UN law also ﬂ ows from 
the privileged place of the latter in the international legal order. Invoking 
amongst others the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and cus-
tomary international law, the CFI arguably considers the EU somehow to 
be subordinate to the UN.64 So the CFI played its monist card all the way. 
Not only did it by way of its International Fruit rationale allow UN law to 
enter the domestic legal order of the EU, it also applied a reasoning in 
which the autonomy of EU law, in view of the broader global legal order, 
has a principled limited nature.65 In this light, it also becomes easier to 
understand why the CFI, as its only means of review, took recourse to 
ius cogens.66 As a judicial player in an institutionally decentralised but 
normatively hierarchical ordered world, it has the power to apply interna-
tional norms to which even UN organs have to submit.67 
In sum, it seems that the ECJ and the CFI adopt wholly different 
perspectives on the nature of the international legal order and the rela-
tionship between norms originating from this order and their own do-
mestic law. Whereas the CFI applied an integrated, vertical point of view, 
the ECJ assumed a segregated, horizontal one, sticking to a notion of 
autonomy that enables it to approach matters of jurisdiction and valid-
ity solely in reference to its own framework of norms. The ECJ has been 
thoroughly criticised for this,68 in particular in view of its earlier case law, 
in which, so the argument goes, it attested to a fairly moderate monist 
stance - in the sense that it opened the EU legal order for the effects of 
64  Kadi (n 3) paras 221-225; Yusuf (n 3) paras 272-276. See also de Búrca (n 8) 28, 40-43. 
After Kadi and Yusuf, the CFI to a certain degree attenuated its deferential reasoning on the 
sanction issue. This was most apparent in Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines 
du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006] II-4665 (OMPI I) in which the Court struck down the list-
ing of the applicant under Council Regulation (EC) no 2580/2001. An important difference 
between OMPI I on the one hand and Kadi and Yusuf on the other hand, however, was that 
the SC resolution that led to the adoption of the contested regulation in the former case 
gave the Member States leeway with regard to the listing of suspected persons and organi-
sations, whereas the resolution in the latter cases expressly provided for this. Although it 
did not go as far as invalidating the measures that were being disputed, the CFI in another 
line of sanction cases speciﬁ ed stricter demands with respect to the diplomatic protection to 
be granted to affected persons at the level of the UN. See on this point n 94.
65  Cf Bjørn Kunoy and Anthony Dawes, ‘Plate Tectonics in Luxembourg: The Ménage à 
Trois Between EC Law, International Law and the European Convention on Human Rights 
Following the UN Sanctions Cases’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 73, 89-92.
66  Kadi (n 3) paras 227-231; Yusuf (n 3) paras 278-282. On the tenability of the CFI’s ius 
cogens review, see: Daniel Halberstam and Eric Stein, ‘The United Nations, the European 
Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural 
World Order’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 13, 51-58. 
67  Cf Martin Nettesheim, ‘UN Sanction against Individuals - A Challenge to the Architec-
ture of European Union Governance’ WHI-Paper No 1/07, 22-27 <http://whi-berlin.de/pa-
pers/2007.dhtml>. 
68  See n 8. 
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international law and, thus, developed a line of communication with the 
outside world. Is this critique justiﬁ ed? The fact is that, partly due to a 
lack of explicit provisions in the Treaties to that end, it is hard to detect a 
fully coherent vision on the correlation with external law in the case law 
of the Court.69 This is something that is perhaps not so strange given the 
peculiar structure of the EU polity. It is true, however, that the ECJ in 
the past has shown itself to be relatively receptive of international law. 
Hence, in Haegeman, a case stemming from the mid 1970s, it declared 
that agreements concluded by the Community under what is now Article 
300 EC ‘from the coming into force thereof, form an integral part of Com-
munity law’.70 A couple of years later, in Kupferberg, the Court explained 
that this mainly had to do with the fact that the Community can be held 
responsible for the performance of the international obligations it has as-
sumed.71 On the same ground, it later extended its reasoning over rules 
of customary international law and, when it considers itself bound by 
this, over treaties not concluded by the Community.72 With the notable 
exception of WTO law, the ECJ has also in many instances granted direct 
effect to international norms, meaning that such norms can be relied 
upon in front of a European court.73 This has to be distinguished from the 
concept of reception. The fact that a rule of international law is binding 
upon the Community, and thus an integral part of it, does not automati-
cally mean that such a rule can also be invoked. 
Despite its normally open stance, it is important to note, however, 
that also in the past the Court has always regarded the EU’s own consti-
tutional framework as an ultimate point of reference. This is apparent in 
that on a couple of occasions the Court annulled decisions incorporating 
69  For that reason, the European Parliament in 1997 adopted a resolution calling for an 
explicit mechanism in the Treaties. See ‘Resolution on the Relationship between Interna-
tional Law, Community Law and the Constitutional Law of the Member States’ [1997] OJ 
C325/26.
70  Case 181/73 R & V Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449 para 5. 
71  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v CA Kupferberg & Cie KG [1982] ECR 3641 paras 11-
13. See further Holdgaard 178-181. In Haegeman, the Court had adopted a more formal 
reasoning, by arguing that the reception of international agreements concluded by the Com-
munity followed from its jurisdiction under, now, art 234 EC, which, inter alia, provides for 
references as to the validity and interpretation of acts of the Council. Thus, in this reading, 
decisions under 300 EC simultaneously count as acts of incorporation. This approach has 
been criticised by Trevor Hartley, who has argued that agreements and decisions formally 
concluding such agreements are not the same thing. See Trevor C Hartley, ‘The European 
Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union’ (1996) 112 LQR 
95, 99-100. Critical of this argument: Anthony Arnull, ‘The European Court and Judicial 
Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley’ (1996) 112 LQR 411.
72  Case C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655; Cases 21-24/72 Inter-
national Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219.
73  See generally Piet Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Consti-
tutional Foundations (OUP, Oxford 2004) Chapter 9.
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international agreements into the EU legal order - both on procedural 
and on substantive grounds.74 Moreover, the autonomous nature of the 
EU according to the ECJ entails that international law, unless explicitly 
provided for, cannot derogate from the binding character of the Treaty. 
In contrast, other allegedly ‘self-contained’ regimes, such as the WTO, 
recognise that, in view of their international law character, at the end of 
the day they have to abide by international law.75 Member States of such 
regimes are within the ﬁ eld of its application generally free to step outside 
the treaty at hand. Due to the principle of autonomy this is not believed 
to be possible in the context of the EU, not only as regards the freedom 
to conclude agreements inter se,76 but for example also when it comes 
to the issue of jurisdiction. Conﬂ icts concerning the application or the 
interpretation of the EC Treaty cannot be dealt with via other methods of 
dispute settlement.77 In effect, this all follows logically from the autono-
mous claim made by the Court in Van Gend & Loos and Costa/ENEL. 
When it expressly contrasted the EEC Treaty with ‘ordinary international 
treaties’, the ECJ not only cut the EU’s umbilical cord with its constitu-
ent parts, the Member States, but also untied her ‘from the existing legal 
order of public international law’.78 Though this may not be conclusive 
of the rank of the EU in the global order, the Court’s previous case law 
on the reception of international law, in that sense, was just as dualist 
as its Kadi decision. Mutatis mutandis, neither can it be said that, com-
pared with earlier cases, the ECJ adopted a very different perspective as 
regards the mode of reception. Indeed, by not considering the EU bound 
to the UN Charter, the issue simply did not come up. The critique that 
with Kadi the Court had exchanged a monist approach for a sharply du-
alist attitude therefore seems undeserved. If the ECJ’s particular line of 
reasoning is to be criticised, other points should be stressed.79  
74  See Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641; Case C-122/95 Germany v 
Council [1998] ECR I-973. See also Kadi (n 1) para 23 of the Opinion of A-G Maduro. 
75  See eg Joost Pauwelyn, Conﬂ ict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2003) 87-88. But see Piet 
Eeckhout, ‘Kadi and Al Barakaat: Luxembourg is not Texas - or Washington DC’ Blog of the 
European Journal of International Law of 25 February 2009 <http://www.ejiltalk.org/kadi-
and-al-barakaat-luxembourg-is-not-texas-or-washington-dc/>. 
76  See eg Opinion 1/91 (EEA Agreement) [1991] ECR 6079. See also Bruno de Witte, ‘The 
Emergence of  a European System of Public International Law: The EU and its Member 
States as Strange Subjects’ in Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper and Erika de Wet (eds), 
The Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and its 
Member States (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 45-48.
77  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 (Mox Plant).
78  Kadi (n 1) para 21 of the Opinion of A-G Maduro. 
79  See text in notes 97-113.
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IV Constitutional repercussions 
Sovereignty, Carl Schmitt remarked, is a border concept.80 With this 
description, Schmitt referred to the twilight zone between the factual and 
the normative, from where, in the event of a political conﬂ ict, the true 
sovereign would appear. In Kadi, it is submitted, the principle of au-
tonomy, whatever its theoretical differences from a classical conception 
of sovereignty, plays a similar role. By ﬁ rmly positioning the EU at the 
external borders of the European legal order, the ECJ, it could be argued, 
simultaneously afﬁ rms the Union’s overall claim to authority within that 
legal order. 
As pointed out previously, the ECJ did not think the EU to be bound 
by the UN Charter. Therefore, the resolution in question did not consti-
tute an integral part of the EU legal order, which, in turn, enabled the 
Court to review the contested regulation in relative isolation. As the Court 
implicitly acknowledged in its ruling, this does not diminish the fact that, 
as a matter of international law, the SC measure remains binding on the 
Member States.81 Could this also mean that the Member States are free 
or even bound to implement the resolution in their own municipal legal 
orders? A possible basis for this argument can be found in Article 297 
EC and Article 60 (2) EC, which, deviating from the EC Treaty, provide for 
the adoption of measures necessary for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Another, less speciﬁ c, rationale supplies Article 307 
EC, excepting agreements concluded before the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Rome from the range of EU law. According to A-G Maduro, 
however, this is not convincing.82 Invoking the Court in Centro-Com, he 
argued that ‘the powers retained by the Member States in the ﬁ eld of the 
security policy must be exercised in a manner consistent with Commu-
nity law’.83 In light of the unity of the common market, this would also 
call for respect for fundamental rights. Put differently, by regulating the 
sanctions regime imposed by the SC in the context of Community law, 
the EU has exempted the issue from unilateral action on the part of the 
Member States and, notwithstanding the sensitive nature of the measure 
and its origins in the CFSP, pulled it into the realm of the ﬁ rst pillar. 
80  See Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität (8th edn 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2004) 13.
81  Kadi (n 1) para 288.
82  The Court itself remained largely silent on the possibility of Member States implement-
ing the sanctions unilaterally. See, critically, the annotation on Kadi by Andrea Gattini in 
(2009) 46 CML Rev 213, 226.  
83  Kadi (n 1) para 30 of the Opinion of A-G Maduro, referring to Case C-124/95 Centro-Com 
[1997] ECR I-81, para 25. See also Robert Schütze, ‘On “Middle Ground”. The European 
Community and Public International Law’ (2007) EUI Working Paper Law No 2007/13, 17-
19 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/ handle/1814/6817>.
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Convincing though this may be, it should be emphasised that this 
reasoning departs from the viewpoint of EU law. But what about the 
perspective of the Member States? If the relation between EU law and na-
tional law is perceived as being controlled by pluralist dynamics, in which 
the autonomy of the EU legal order is placed alongside the autonomy of 
national constitutional orders, this does not seem altogether clear. How 
far does the commitment of the Member States go? In effect, it could be 
said that they are caught between two conﬂ icting loyalties. In the ﬁ rst 
place, of course, loyalty is required towards their obligations under EU 
law. This follows from several provisions in the Treaties: from the general 
obligation of Article 10 EC, from a more speciﬁ c provision like Article 292 
EC, but also, for instance, from Article 307 EC, which, besides creating 
a way out of the scope of EU law, calls for eliminating incompatibilities 
between prior obligations and Community obligations. Secondly, how-
ever, there is the duty of the Member States ex Article 103 UN to accord 
primacy to obligations arising under the Charter. Within the framework 
of constitutional pluralism, the choice of which loyalty weighs heavier in 
a case like Kadi cannot be exclusively made by the ECJ. Certainly, the 
Court is expected to rule as it thinks ﬁ t. In addition, it is noteworthy that 
the ECJ did not overlook the dangers of a legal vacuum resulting from 
the annulment of the sanction regulation in Kadi and ordered the effects 
of the contested measure to be maintained for a period of three months, 
thus enabling the Member States to review their decision and prevent-
ing national authorities from possibly implementing the SC resolution 
independently of the EU.84 Still, one of the inherent characteristics of Eu-
ropean pluralism appears to be that in matters of existential proportions 
the ECJ has no ultimate authority to conclusively decide which course 
the Member States have to follow. This is especially apparent in the case 
of factual pluralism, as supported by Barents. For, if both the EU and 
Member States belong to completely self-referential legal orders, with no 
normative cement in the middle, how is a Member State supposed to re-
spond to a conﬂ icting obligation stemming from a ‘third party’ that has 
its own particular claim to supremacy?85 
Approaching the issue through the lens of normative pluralism is 
also not without problems. As will be recalled, this brand of constitution-
al pluralism presupposes the existence of a latent, overarching normative 
framework: a language of mutual values, so to speak, from which both 
EU and national players are to deduce answers to conﬂ icting situations 
84  Kadi (n 1) paras 374-376.
85  Arguably, this would be different if a Member State were to ‘constitutionalise’ the EU, 
as for example probably happened in France. See Chloé Charpy, ‘The Status of (Secondary) 
Community Law in the French Internal Order: the Recent Case-Law of the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel and the Conseil d’Etat’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 436. 
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that may arise between them. It follows that the ECJ, as a matter of 
jurisdiction, has no ﬁ nal say as regards the interpretation and applica-
tion of these principles of values. In theory, this does not have to be an 
insurmountable problem. Underlying normative pluralism, at least in a 
substantive way, is the idea that a certain level of coherence is guaran-
teed through the demand that players on both sides have to adhere to 
the same higher principles. It does, however, become problematic if more 
than one principle is in play. As a broader European value, respect for 
international law seems just as important as respect for fundamental 
rights. It has been argued that this is only the case if international law 
carries the promise of ‘liberalising’ domestic legal orders.86 It appears, 
however, doubtful if this rationale can be accepted: international security 
constitutes a perfectly legitimate interest.
What to make of this? To begin with, it is possible to argue that 
Kadi, despite the ECJ’s encompassing reasoning, does not necessarily 
run counter to the concept of constitutional pluralism. Arguably not so 
much because of the Court’s particular fundamental rights rationale, but 
because of the fact that it was clearly within its jurisdiction to decide on 
the merits of the case, and that, once within the reach of its competence, 
one can expect the Court to insist upon a uniform application of EU law. 
Nevertheless, Kadi also exhibits features that do not sit comfortably with 
a pluralist conceptualisation. For one thing, there is the overriding im-
portance that the ECJ in its ruling attaches to the rule of law. As Baquero 
Cruz has pointed out, when it comes to judicial activity and law applica-
tion, ‘any order may decay sooner or later without a minimum degree of 
predictability with regard to its application’.87 Thus, rule-of-law require-
ments such as legal certainty and individual rights protection, in the 
end, seem to necessitate a level of hierarchy. And implicit in hierarchy is 
that someone has the last word. Although not declaring this in so many 
words, such a sense of hierarchy indeed appears to have been on the 
Court’s mind. This is most apparent in the special treatment the ECJ in 
Kadi gave to Article 6 EU. By stressing that exception provisions such as 
Article 297 EC and Article 307 EC ‘cannot (…) be understood to authorise 
any derogation from the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 6 (1) EU 
as a foundation of the Union’, it effectively lifted this latter provision to a 
86  See Iris Canor, ‘“Can Two Walk Together, Except They be Agreed?” The Relationship 
Between International Law and European Law: The Incorporation of United Nations Sanc-
tions Against Yugoslavia Into European Community Law Through the Perspective of the 
European Court of Justice’ (1998) 35 CML Rev 137, 171.
87  See Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Move-
ment’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 389, 414.
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‘normatively superior category’.88 Although it is true that this statement 
in some ways reﬂ ects earlier pronouncements on the limited applicability 
of Article 307 EC, the Court has never been so blunt in derogating from 
provisions that are themselves primarily to be understood as derogation 
clauses.89 
In elevating Article 6 EU as the archimedical point of the EU’s legal 
order, the ECJ seems to leave little room for a pluralist conception of the 
EU - at least in the sense that there is no arbiter able to decide on the 
outer perimeters of the larger European normative framework. For, in 
order to be a veritable Community of law, as the EU purports to be, such 
an authority is necessary to protect the borders of this framework. Arti-
cles 297 EC and 307 EC, accordingly, do not function as reserves of sov-
ereignty, capable of competing with that claim, but as exceptions at the 
will of the Court.90 If this were different, as A-G Maduro rightly remarked, 
Member States could use the Community to circumvent human rights 
guarantees at a national level.91 This is not to claim that the ECJ thinks 
that values such as fundamental rights are absolute, but it does mean 
that in the absence of an adequate justiﬁ cation it is not prepared to allow 
for gaps in the European legal order.92 If this understanding is correct, 
it would in turn entail that, as far as the Court is concerned, the princi-
ple autonomy serves as the foundation for a claim to normative author-
ity that encompasses this whole order. The fact that the Member States 
stay competent to act outside the sphere of the EU, in conceptual terms 
means little if the latter can decide on the demarcation of that sphere. 
Of course, all things considered, the ECJ’s ﬁ rm position in Kadi re-
mains a claim, and as such is only valid until proven otherwise. In addi-
tion, most national constitutional courts still do not accept this claim. Fi-
nally, there is the already mentioned question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
The Court’s claim to normative authority on behalf of the EU is mainly 
one of interpretative autonomy; the question of constitutional authority - 
ie who decides who decides - is obscure. For that reason, the EU remains 
in a state of constitutional ﬂ ux. Pluralism suggests that this is a good 
thing, that this is what makes the EU unique. Unquestionably, there 
is a lot of truth in this: the special institutional set-up, dividing powers 
between the EU and its Member States, indeed enables a ‘mutual cor-
88  See de Búrca (n 8) 36. Cf also Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutional Principles’ in Von 
Bogdandy and Bast (n 36) 3.
89  Cf Jan Klabbers, ‘Moribund on the Fourth of July? The Court of Justice on Prior Agree-
ments of the Member States’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 187.
90  Cf Eeckhout (n 73) 440-444.
91  Kadi (n 1) para 31 of the Opinion of A-G Maduro. 
92  See eg Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Trans-
port, Energy and Communications [1996] ECR I-3953 para 21.
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rection of each other’s constitutional malfunctions’.93 The point rather 
is that Kadi shows how difﬁ cult it is to maintain such an equilibrium in 
the face of fundamental questions being imposed upon the EU’s special 
constitutional structure from outside its cocoon. In the end, concerns for 
the rule of law and uniformity win the day. 
V Alternatives 
As a ﬁ nal question, could Kadi have been decided in a way to show 
more respect for pluralistic constitutional principles? At ﬁ rst glance, the 
CFI came closer to this than the ECJ. After all, respect for diversity of 
sources within a constitutional conﬁ guration also seems to suggest a 
certain reverence for sources outside that formation. Indeed, one could 
argue that taking constitutional pluralism seriously entails that differ-
ent orders are by implication interlinked and, hence, that autonomy is 
by deﬁ nition a limited concept. It is submitted, though, that the CFI fails 
this test. For one thing, it is not at all clear that this court’s open attitude 
vis-à-vis international law translates into a corresponding posture in the 
internal European order. The ruling of the CFI even points in the oppo-
site direction. By stressing that the Charter imposes a clear obligation 
upon the Member States and, save a ius cogens test, by immunising the 
resolution as a matter of EU law, the CFI, by way of the principle of su-
premacy, effectively appears to bar the door to judicial review by national 
courts.94 This may be said to follow logically from the assumption that the 
93  Maduro (n 37) 523. 
94  See Eckes (n 61) 87. The only redress that the CFI envisages is the trajectory of diplo-
matic protection, ie Member States bringing up cases of affected nationals for delisting in 
front of the UN Sanctions Committee. See Kadi (n 3) para 270; Yusuf (n 3) para 317. In later 
sanctions cases, the CFI even appears to formulate a communitarian obligation on the part 
of the Member States to enable its nationals to present their cases before the Sanctions 
Committee. See Case T-253/02 Chaﬁ q Ayadi v Council [2006] ECR II-2139 paras 144-148; 
Case T-49/04 Faraj Hassan v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-52 paras 119-122. 
Critical of this reasoning are Kunoy and Dawes (n 65) 92-96, who assert that diplomatic 
protection, being a traditional international law tool in the hands of states, cannot be con-
ceived as an obligation. Anyway, diplomatic protection, however framed, is no up-to-par 
equivalent of judicial or administrative review by national authorities, who, upon ﬁ nding a 
violation of national fundamental rights, could order a government to unblock funds. An, 
admittedly rare, example of such an action has recently been provided by a Belgian court, 
which threatened to impose a considerable ﬁ ne on the government if it failed to unlock the 
ﬁ nancial assets of the plaintiff whom the court considered to be unjustly accused of ties 
with terrorist organisations. (See Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck, Judgment of 11 February 
2005, RG 2004/2435-A IA/26834-A (Brussels Court of First Instance)). The Belgian govern-
ment thereupon initiated proceedings at the UN Sanctions Committee to get the applicant’s 
name delisted, although so far without success. The Sayadi case, therefore, at the same 
time serves to show that remedies in domestic courts often have a limited nature and that 
obtaining a court order is not necessarily the end of the story. Compare in this respect 
the views of the UN Human Rights Committee of 29 December 2008, Communication No 
1472/2006, in the same case, which, although conﬁ rming the duty of the Belgian state to 
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international legal order is somehow coherent, hierarchical, and that UN 
law, because of its higher rank, has to be abided by. In the absence of an 
international authority capable of maintaining such coherence, however, 
there is the inherent danger that this order will disintegrate. By empow-
ering itself to review actions of institutions outside its natural habitat 
with norms that equally originate from outside its own legal order, the ju-
risdiction of the CFI becomes theoretically unlimited. It could be argued 
that this is a desirable development and that within a paradigm of ‘open 
functionally interlinked and mutually constraining entities’ the effective-
ness of and compliance with international law is enhanced, even to the 
extent that this leads to a ‘constitutionalisation’ of the latter. Then again, 
if other courts followed the example of the CFI, there would be the risk of 
diverging outcomes, so that instead of leading to constitutionalisation it 
would only enhance fragmentation of international law.95 
If the CFI’s vision is to be discarded as a viable alternative, does 
this mean in turn that the ‘robust pluralist’ reading of the ECJ has to 
be accepted, and, a fortiori, that there is no international legal order in 
an autonomous sense, but only separate entities drifting in an ocean of 
derivative normativity? Denouncing Kelsen’s claim of a world constitu-
tion, Schmitt in this regard observed that the concept of an international 
community constituted ‘nur der Reﬂ ex der Koexistenz selbständiger poli-
tischer Einheiten’.96 For this reason, international law could not really be 
termed law. This may have been conceivable in the 1920s, but in today’s 
post World War II global era it seems hardly acceptable. Most important-
ly, it can also not actually be presumed that the ECJ embraces this view. 
Accordingly, the question becomes whether it is possible for the ECJ to 
simultaneously preserve the autonomy of the EU and still be more open 
to international law than it was in Kadi. Drawing on de Búrca, a potential 
way out can be found in the strategy of ‘soft constitutionalism’.97 In short, 
a soft constitutionalist approach comes down to a Kantian understand-
ing of the international legal order in which states and other like entities 
coexist in a heterarchical manner, but at the same time aspire to live up 
to common and universal norms with which to address conﬂ ict. Soft con-
stitutionalism, therefore, appears to be very much akin to European nor-
mative pluralism, with the only real difference being the scale on which 
such norms can be found.
pursue the delisting of the applicant, was divided as regards the extent of the responsibility 
of a state to secure this. 
95  Nettesheim (n 67) 24-25.
96  Schmitt (n 58) 73 (‘… only the reﬂ ex of the coexistence of autonomous political entities’ 
- transl. JWvR). 
97  See de Búrca (n 8) 52-55. Cf also Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘Cosmopolitan Law’ (2003) 9 Eu-
ropean Law Journal 241.
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According to this strategy, the ECJ, instead of addressing the issue 
in Kadi exclusively in terms of EU fundamental rights, could have pulled 
international legal standards - customary international law, the Charter - 
into the discussion. For example, it could have done so by focusing on the 
lack of due process at the moment of implementation of the resolution 
into European law.98 As such, it is argued, the Court would have been 
able to contribute to an international debate and involve national actors, 
while achieving the same substantive result. Secondly, one can think 
of the Solange doctrine of the German Constitutional Court.99 As stated 
earlier, in this well-known chapter of European integration, the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht, on a couple of occasions, entered into a dialogue with 
the ECJ on the protection of fundamental rights in the Community. This 
test, which has recently also been applied by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) vis-à-vis the EU, can be said to be performed through 
an open window between two, mutually linked, legal orders.100 Thus, the 
result would be a blend of shared values. Arguably, A-G Maduro came 
close in applying some kind of Solange reasoning in his review of the al-
leged breaches of fundamental rights in Kadi. Although Maduro in the 
end considers the level of protection at the UN too inadequate to bow to 
its authority,101 he did take notice of the fact that ‘the Court should be 
mindful of the international context in which it operates’ and that in ‘an 
increasingly interdependent world, different legal orders will have to en-
deavour to accommodate each other’s jurisdictional claims’.102 The ECJ, 
however, seems to decline to develop such a test. Asked if the re-exami-
nation procedure before the Sanctions Committee - the ancillary organ 
of the SC responsible for overseeing the sanctions - did not amount to a 
sufﬁ cient legal remedy, the Court responded, in a seemingly general way, 
that this could not ‘give rise to a generalised immunity from jurisdiction 
within the internal legal order of the Community’, because that ‘proce-
dure does not offer the guarantees of judicial protection.’103
Soft constitutionalism is based on the premise that the EU is some-
how able to open up for UN law. At ﬁ rst glance, earlier case law of the 
ECJ indeed suggests that this is possible. Most notably in Bosphorus, a 
case that dealt with sanctions applied in the context of the war in former 
Yugoslavia, the Court showed no restraint in referring and interpreting 
the SC resolution which constituted the basis for the contested regula-
98  de Búrca (n 8) 57-58. 
99  de Búrca (n 8) 58-61. See also Griller (n 49) 544-545.
100  See ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari v Ireland [2006] EHRR 42.  
101  Kadi (n 1) para 54 of the Opinion of A-G Maduro.
102  Kadi (n 1) para 44 of the Opinion of A-G Maduro. See also Halberstam and Stein (n 66) 
58-61.
103  Kadi (n 1) paras 321-322.  
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tion.104 However, just as in Kadi, the ECJ did not consider the resolution 
at issue to be binding upon the EU. The measure also did not form an 
integral part of the Community legal order. From a formal point of view, 
this seems strange. How could the ECJ seek recourse to an external rule 
if it was not part of the EU legal order?105 Looking to Haegeman and Kup-
ferberg, one gets the impression that being an ‘integral part of Commu-
nity law’ is inextricably linked with the binding nature of an international 
measure.106 Therefore, it could be argued that the question of reception 
does not prevent the Court from being able to reach out to international 
law for interpretative purposes. This appears to be conﬁ rmed by the ex-
tensive way the ECJ in its case law refers to the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR).107 The ECHR, though not (yet) formally binding 
upon the EU, has served as a source of inspiration for the Community 
since the early 1970s,108 something that was expressly allowed by the 
inclusion in the Treaty of Maastricht of a reference to the human rights 
treaty.109 Indeed, on some occasions, the ECJ even directly resorted to a 
provision of the ECHR.110
Why, then, did the ECJ emphasise that UN law could not be used in 
Kadi? Why did it not refer to UN human rights standards in an interpre-
tative way? A straightforward answer would be that this would not have 
been relevant in Kadi. First of all, the disputed resolution, in contrast, for 
example, to Bosphorus, left no room for manoeuvre as to its implementa-
tion. Secondly, one could argue that UN law did not really conﬂ ict with 
EU law in Kadi; that is, the question whether Member States are obliged, 
under EU law, to provide for review of decisions listing individuals under 
the sanctions regime is in principle unrelated to the question whether 
they are obliged, under UN law, to implement anti-terrorism sanctions.111 
Furthermore, the UN Charter, unlike the ECHR, is not a human rights 
instrument, and even to the extent that it can be considered as such, it 
does not provide the same level of protection as the ECHR or the EU’s 
own general principles. In this regard, more fundamental could be the 
fact that the Charter, because of its different character from the ECHR, 
is not suited just to serve as an interpretative instrument. The Charter 
104  See n 92. 
105  See n 59.
106  See ns 70-71.
107  See generally Sionaidh Douglass-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg 
and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 629.
108  See Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491.
109  See art 6 (2) EU juncto art 46 (d) EU. 
110  See eg Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. 
111  See Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘UN Sanctions and Judicial Review’ in Wouters, Nollkaemper 
and de Wet (n 76) 194-195.
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is the constitution of an organisation that comprises institutions which 
can issue binding legislative measures. Therefore, the only alternative in 
front of the Court might have been to opt for the substitution rationale of 
International Fruit, which was applied by the CFI. Apart from the question 
about whether or not this reasoning is convincing,112 within the conﬁ nes 
of the ECJ’s understanding of autonomy, this would have meant that the 
Charter, as an integral part of the Community legal order, would have 
been placed below EU law, which a correct reading of Article 103 UN also 
seems to allow.113 Not only is this not without political signiﬁ cance, it also 
raises important questions as regards the legal effects of such a move. 
Would this, for example, mean that resolutions or the Charter could be 
invoked within the ﬁ eld of application of EU law, or that, in a hypothetical 
situation, the Court could disapply UN law? 
In sum, the Court in Kadi faced a difﬁ cult choice. By opening the EU 
legal order up to UN law, on one hand the ECJ would have created a win-
dow of opportunity to discuss human rights in a global context and, thus, 
inﬂ uence this debate. Speaking out on this, however, would have entailed 
the risk of binding the EU to a category of law, with consequences that 
would possibly outweigh the advantages of a more communicating pos-
ture. In this regard, it will be interesting to see how the Court responds to 
the new Lisbon Treaty, which, in Article 3 (5) EU, stipulates that the EU 
will honour the principles of the UN Charter. Moreover, even with this in-
clusion, it remains uncertain how the ECJ will react to future challenges 
similar to those in Kadi. Inherent, for example, in the Solange approach, 
it seems that the Court will have to differentiate between measures with 
a purely domestic character and measures that originate outside the le-
gal order. Is it prepared to lower the threshold of fundamental rights 
protection, and consequently the rule of law, for the beneﬁ t of interna-
tional law? Indeed, if the ECJ were to lower this threshold, it might also 
paradoxically run the risk of seeing certain national constitutional courts 
retract their particular Solange statements vis-à-vis the EU. 
If, on the other hand, the ECJ persists in its dualist attitude towards 
international law, its case law might become self-defeating, for then it 
could be argued that it does not live up to the promise of Europe’s nor-
mative appeal to the world, especially given that the EU itself remains 
largely unchecked in the face of its legal surroundings. This can be seen 
most clearly in the case law of the ECtHR, which, in the absence of formal 
jurisdiction over the EU, is very careful in reviewing acts that stem from 
Brussels.114 In this sense, it is a good thing that, under the Lisbon Treaty, 
112  See Eeckhout (n 73) 437-440. 
113  See Nettesheim (n 67) 23. 
114  The ECtHR lingers between a Solange approach (n 99) and focusing solely on the chal-
lenged Member State (Matthews v United Kingdom [1999] BHRC 686 (ECtHR)).   
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the EU will accede to the ECHR.115 Since the dilemma the ECJ saw itself 
confronted with in Kadi under this new constellation would eventually 
only be transposed to another level, it does, however, not solve the prob-
lem as such.116  
VI Conclusion
There is a certain irony in the different ﬁ ndings of the CFI and the 
ECJ in the Kadi case. The CFI, on one hand, applied a reasoning that was 
itself very open to the international legal order, but in the end arrived at a 
conclusion that, instinctively, let this order down. The ECJ, on the other 
hand, employed a rationale that arguably eschewed international law, 
but came up with an outcome that on the face of it must have fulﬁ lled hu-
man rights activists across the globe with joy. Although the ECJ has been 
criticised for being overtly dualist, its stance seems however better defen-
sible than that of the CFI. Departing from the premise that the EU con-
stitutes an autonomous legal order, the Court understandingly asserted 
that the own legal order formed its frame of reference. The conceptual 
tenability of the principle of autonomy as such is, almost half a century 
after its creation, still not without problems. When this claim is accepted, 
however, it follows logically that the ECJ was under no obligation to ac-
cord primacy to international law over the EU’s primary law. The fact that 
Kadi involved UN law does not change this. In contrast to the CFI, which 
approached the international legal order in universalist terms, the Court 
was right to embrace a pluralist point of view in this regard. Abandoning 
a self-referential perspective, admirably though it may seem, could in the 
long term be disruptive. This is not to say that international law can be 
disregarded at will or, for that matter, that there is no such thing as an 
international community. Autonomy, like sovereignty, is not necessarily 
a notion hostile to international law. In a way, both concepts resemble a 
chicken-and-egg story: they presuppose each other. In Kadi, the Court 
chose to let concerns for the rule of law prevail over concerns for inter-
national law. Given the particular situation of the case, this choice was 
a legitimate one. It does not, however, signify that the ECJ embarked on 
a whole new trajectory as regards its views on the relationship of the EU 
with the international legal order.
As a second conclusion, it was submitted in this paper that the at-
titude of the ECJ vis-à-vis the international plane has consequences for, 
that is, it sheds light on, the way the internal set-up of the EU should be 
perceived. In the process of defending the autonomy of the EU legal order 
115  Art 6 (2) EU. 
116  Cf Apps no 71412/01 & 78166/0 Behrami and Behrami v France & Saramati v France, 
Germany and Norway ECtHR 2 May 2007.
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in an external sense, the Court at the same time makes clear that it is 
difﬁ cult to maintain that the foundations of the broader European legal 
order are pluralistic in nature. In order to be a veritable Community of 
law, a gatekeeper is needed to patrol the borders of this order and uphold 
unity therein. In this sense, and notwithstanding the theoretical difﬁ cul-
ties that arise from such a conception, the principle of autonomy entails 
that EU law, in particular the values upon which it is founded, outranks 
national law. To be sure, in light of the diverging explanations as to the 
validity of EU law, it might well be that the paradigm of constitutional 
pluralism to a certain extent reﬂ ects the current status of the European 
constitutional conﬁ guration in a descriptive way. However, as a theoreti-
cal framework that purports to provide answers with respect to the inher-
ent nature of European constitutionalism, it falls short. 
